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ABSTRACT 
 
More than EUR 1.9 trillion is spent each year on public contracts in Europe. In a time 
of economic crisis, there is need to maximise the efficiency of public spending, in 
order to secure budget savings. One of the ways to achieve this is to deter bid 
rigging (collusive tendering), a practice whereby two or more bidders agree on 
aspects of their submissions like, for example, on quality or price. Bid rigging 
undermines competition among bidders and may lead to reduced quality or higher 
prices for goods that are procured by the public sector. In my recent research on 
electronically conducted auctions (e-auctions), one of the most common 
procurement tools that public bodies use in order to acquire goods or services, I 
argue that some elements of the current procurement practice increase the risk of 
collusion and that the new EU Directive on public procurement has not managed to 
adequately deal with those issues.  
 
 
The economic significance of public procurement in Europe is considerable, with public 
authorities in the EU spending every year approximately 14% of GDP on public 
procurement, i.e. more than EUR 1.9 trillion.1  In an attempt to maximize the efficiency of 
public spending in an era of austerity and continued cuts to public purchasing, there is a 
trend towards the use of electronic communications by public bodies when buying 
supplies and services or when tendering public works (e-procurement). E-procurement 
offers a number of benefits such as simplified and shortened processes, reductions in red-
tape and administrative burdens as well as significant savings for all parties.2 Electronic 
auctions (e-auctions) are a representative electronic purchasing technique, the use of 
which has nearly doubled in numbers during 2009 and 2010.3 Public procurement is 
regulated by two EU Directives4 which apply to most of the auctions organised by public 
bodies. Yet, as my research demonstrates, the regulatory framework and practice of e-
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auctions raises competition concerns as they may facilitate anti-competitive practices, such 
as tacit collusion and bid rigging. Collusive activities reduce the level of competition and 
undermine the main objectives of public procurement, such as value for money in the 
acquisition of the required goods, works or services and efficiency in the procurement 
process.  
 
E-auctions are a procurement tool that uses web-based software to allow potential 
suppliers to compete online, in real time, to provide prices for the goods/services under 
auction. E-auctions can be based on price alone or other criteria such as quality, delivery 
or service levels. E-auctions can take two forms; they can be either reverse or forward. In 
the former, the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder and in the latter the bidder with 
the highest price wins the contract, for example when a company bids to purchase paper 
and magazines for recycling. The main characteristic of the e-auction system under the 
new Directive is that throughout each phase of an electronic auction information must be 
communicated to all tenderers in order to enable them to allocate their relative position 
compared to the other participants. This information may include details concerning prices 
or values submitted by other bidders as well as the number of participants in each phase 
of the auction. The identities of the tenderers shall not be disclosed. Another significant 
element of the new Directive is that e-auctions may take place in a number of successive 
phases. Moreover, the new Directive enables contracting authorities to close an electronic 
auction at a previously indicated date and time or when the previously indicated number 
of phases in the auction has been completed. This is a general concern that regards all 
auctions and not only e-auctions. 
 
In my PhD chapter I argue that the new Directive raises a number of competition concerns, 
especially regarding e-auctions. Firstly, the sharing of information facilitates collusive 
schemes between the participants, even with their identities being kept anonymous. The 
main reason for this is that the circulation of price and other related information that is 
mandatory under the Directive enables the bidders to observe the prices at which rivals 
quit as well as the set of valid offers submitted at each round of the e-auction. In this way, 
it is possible for the members of a bidding ring to determine whether their co-conspirators 
kept their promise to submit, for example, “cover bids”, i.e. bids at an artificially high price 
or composed of special terms that are likely to be rejected. Thus, firms engaged in bid 
rigging are able to monitor any deviations from their collusive agreement. Because 
bidders’ identities are not disclosed, the bidding ring will not be able to use targeted 
punishments against the defecting bidder during the same auction. However, the bidding 
ring will still be effective in suppressing rivalry among members because of the knowledge 
that one or several bidders deviated. The general threat of ending the collusive agreement 
and reverse to competitive behaviour for the rest of the e-auction constitutes the greatest 
punishment for the deviating firm. All firms would receive their lower non-collusive profits. 
Because of the information disclosure required in accordance with the Directive, deviating 
from a collusive agreement would no longer be secret.  The disclosure of information that 
makes deviations from the pre-arranged collusive agreement observable, even when 
anonymised,  makes a bidding ring more stable and e-auctions more susceptible to 
collusion.  
 
Secondly, the multi-round format that an e-auction can take may enhance the 
sustainability of a bidding ring, especially in the context of a market whose characteristics 
raise collusion concerns. According to the economic theory of auctions, collusion is likely 
to flourish when auctions repeat at regular intervals so that the same bunch of bidders 
may meet time and time again.5 The repeated interaction among tenderers, even on an 
electronic marketplace and without their identities being disclosed to each other, gives 
them a number of opportunities to observe the process of price formation and monitor 
any deviation from their pre-arranged collusive agreement. After all, information flows well 
in industries, especially when there are only a few suppliers and it may be relatively easy to 
identify ‘anonymous’ bidders. Additionally, the limited time-intervals between the rounds 
of a multi-round e-auction strengthen the enforcement structure of a bidding ring, as any 
deviating member of the ring may face threat of immediate retaliation at the next stage of 
the e-auction.6 
  
Thirdly, the new Directive enables contracting authorities in e-auctions to award a contract 
based on price only. Especially the ‘lowest price’ criterion in a reverse e-auction raises 
collusion concerns. Though the lowest price criterion is not exclusive to e-auctions, the 
anticompetitive effects of this awarding criterion may be stronger in case of e-auctions, 
where the price is the predominant criterion to select the winning bid rather than the 
criterion of ‘economically advantageous’.7 . In an environment where competition is driven 
only by price considerations and bidders are symmetric, bidding firms find it easier to 
agree on a collusive scheme. Where the public purchaser does not have any specific 
preferences regarding the quality of the products/services procured and the bidders are 
symmetric, for the latter it is like competing with cost symmetry in a multi-round e-
auction.8 This increases the risk of collusion because under such circumstances, the 
bidders can more easily suppress all ring competition in their cartel and allocate the 
collusive gains among them.9   
 
The susceptibility of e-auctions to anti-competitive practices could be reduced by altering 
and reinterpreting the existing framework. To start with, procuring authorities should only 
disclose the minimum amount of information about the bidding history of other bidders. 
This would reduce the probability that deviations from the collusive agreement are 
observed, thus destabilising the bidding ring. For example, authorities could avoid 
disclosing the prices at which rivals quitted the auction or the number of valid offers 
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submitted per round. It should be sufficient for a bidder competing in an e-auction to 
know whether its own bid is the leading one and what is the price of the leading bid. This 
information still enables the auctioneer to gauge the price that it ought to submit at the 
next round of the auction.10 The contracting authority could also delay the publication of 
information to hinder collusion among auctioneers. By doing this, deviation of bidders 
from the collusive agreement will be delayed and so will be the punishment of the 
defector. It may also render punishment practically impossible if the e-auction has already 
closed.11 In markets with concerns about collusion, authorities should also consider a 
single round of e-bids rather than e-auctions with multiple phases. The one-round format 
that characterizes e-bids “cannot be easily manipulated to coordinate bidder strategies 
and thus constitute an anti-cartel device”.12  
 
The new Public Procurement Directive has not fully addressed the issue of collusive 
outcomes in e-auctions but contracting authorities may reduce the risk of bid rigging by 
reducing certainty for potential bid riggers and reducing the amount of information 
provided to bidders.  
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